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ABSTRACT
Aware that humans and nature are inseparably linked many or-
ganisations in Madagascar support the community-based natural 
resource management approach to promote the international po-
licy of biodiversity conservation and protection. In this context, 
community associations have been introduced to transfer mana-
gement and use rights for natural resources to the local popula-
tion. However, the fast, donor-driven top-down procedure of 
establishing new rules contradicts the local rhythm and handling 
of rules. Against this background, this paper focuses on the ethnic 
group Tanalana and explores key actors and locally initiated rules 
and agreements, analyses their level of effectiveness and dis-
cusses their possible application for community-based natural re-
source management in the buffer zone of Tsimanampesotse 
National Park in southwestern Madagascar. The paper looks at an 
example of rule negotiation outside the community-based mana-
gement context concerning the use of a key resource in raising li-
vestock. The example demonstrates that, on the one hand, the 
overlapping memberships in different social and kinship groups, 
and on the other hand, different individual economic interests can 
hinder successful collective action for natural resource manage-
ment. Moreover, this example shows that already existing or new-
ly introduced rules can be further called into question and are 
variously interpreted depending on the context. The degree of 
sanctions depends on several factors: (i) frequency of transgres-
sion, (ii) amount of affected persons, (iii) social relationships bet-
ween the concerned parties and (iiii) social and communicative 
behaviour of the transgressor (in the past and present). This study 
finds that rules serve as rough guidelines, as a basis for discus-
sion in cases of transgression, but do not function as fixed pres-
criptions. The data for this study was collected through 
semi-structured interviews and participative observation in six fo-
kontany (village and related hamlets) to the east and west of Tsi-
manampesotse National Park.
RÉSUMÉ 
Dans le contexte de la protection et de la conservation de la bio-
diversité, de nombreuses organisations de développement ap-
puient la création d’organismes et la formulation de régle- 
mentations en vue d’une gestion durable des ressources natu-
relles autour des aires protégées de Madagascar. Dans la zone 
tampon du Parc National Tsimanampesotse, des transferts des 
droits d’usage et de gestion des ressources naturelles d’un terri-
toire précis à la population locale, suivant l’approche de com-
munity-based management, ont été réalisés. Dans la mesure où la 
population rurale dépend étroitement des ressources naturelles, 
la nécessité de son intégration participative dans le processus de 
la protection est évidente. L’objectif premier d’instaurer de nou-
velles règles sur les structures locales préexistantes était rare-
ment réalisable à cause de la rapidité de l’élaboration des 
contrats de transfert de gestion. La présente recherche se 
concentre sur le groupe ethnique Tanalana, en tant que plus 
grand groupe de cette région et principal utilisateur des res-
sources naturelles du territoire du Parc National Tsimanampe-
sotse, dans la région Atsimo Andrefana dans le Sud-ouest de 
Madagascar. Les acteurs clés et la négociation des règles locales 
sont ici exposés pour analyser leur domaine d’action et discuter 
leur applicabilité dans le contexte du community-based natural 
resource management. L’exemple d’un processus de négociation 
pour la gestion d’une ressource clé pour l’élevage hors du 
contexte de community-based management montre les différents 
facteurs qui compliquent une action collective à succès pour la 
gestion des ressources naturelles : d’un côté une personne est si-
multanément membre des différent groupes sociaux et parentaux 
qui déterminent des droits et obligations pour l’utilisation des res-
sources et de l’autre côté les individus ont des intérêts écono-
miques différents qui, selon leur position sociale, influencent les 
décisions collectives. En outre, cet exemple montre que les règles 
existantes ou nouvellement mises en place peuvent être remises 
en question et interprétées différemment selon le contexte. 
L’étude de cas a été menée de manière qualitative dans six fokon-
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tany à l’ouest, vers le littoral, et à l’est sur le plateau du Parc Na-
tional dans la commune de Beheloke, via des interviews semi-
structurées des divers acteurs individuels et collectifs. Les 
membres de cette société agro-pastorale, se déployant des deux 
côtés du Parc, sont liés à travers une même origine, le mouve-
ment bidirectionnel de la transhumance et le commerce. Pour 
mieux comprendre l’interaction sociale et le processus de négo-
ciation des intérêts dans la gestion des ressources, nous avons 
également mené une observation participative à plusieurs 
réunions et activités quotidiennes.
INTRODUCTION
Madagascar’s status as a ‘biodiversity hotspot’ (Myers et al. 2000) 
attracted the World Bank and international conservation groups in 
1988 to technically and financially support the Malagasy Govern-
ment for the elaboration of the National Environmental Action 
Plan (NEAP), carried out in three phases from 1990–2008 (Hanson 
2012). The plan aims to find solutions for Madagascar’s environ-
mental problems such as deforestation, loss of biodiversity, ero-
sion and soil degradation (Mercier 2006). The main objectives of 
the first phase (1990–1997) were the establishment of an institu-
tional infrastructure for conservation activities in already existing 
and newly established protected areas, and the promotion of Inte-
grated Conservation Development Projects (ICDP), which aimed to 
provide alternative income possibilities to resource use for local 
people living in the peripheral zones of protected areas (Marcus 
and Kull 1999, Raik 2007, Hanson 2012). The donor-driven ICDP ap-
proach did not meet local needs because of its standardized and 
inflexible character. It failed to improve the economic conditions 
for the local population and consequently did not manage to ex-
clude humans from resource use in protected areas (Marcus and 
Kull 1999, Raik 2007, Pollini 2011, Hanson 2012, Waeber et al. 
2016).
During the second phase of the NEAP (1997–2002) the focus 
was on the implementation of a new, participatory bottom-up ma-
nagement approach, community-based management (CBM). Two 
laws were enacted in Madagascar aimed at decentralising go-
vernment control over natural resources, both of which enabled a 
contractual transfer of management rights of natural resources to 
the local population: the GELOSE-law (Gestion Locale Sécurisée) of 
1996 applies to forest, pasture, wildlife and water; the GCF-law 
(Gestion Contractuelle des Forêts) of 2001 specifies the manage-
ment of forest resources and facilitates the administrative proce-
dure (Antona et al. 2004). With strong support from 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), about 1200 voluntary 
user associations- named COBAs (Communauté de base)—were 
founded in the 22 regions of Madagascar (Bertrand et al. 2014) to 
develop their own rules and sanctions for natural resource use 
and to control compliance in the transferred areas (Kull 2002). The 
extendable three-year COBA contracts determine the time period 
and amount of resource use to be regulated; for resource users, a 
fee-based authorisation is required from the association’s execu-
tive board.
Several authors have observed the CBM movement in va-
rious regions of Madagascar and have identified many problems, 
questioning the compatibility with local social structures (Blanc-
Pamard and Fauroux 2004, Goedefroit 2006, Fritz-Vietta et al. 
2009, Bérard 2011, Pollini 2011, Pollini et al. 2014). Many re-
searchers criticise development agencies’ “race of contracts” (Bé-
rard 2011), which very often causes a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach 
resulting in a lack of participation by local people (Pollini et al. 
2014). Instead of supporting entire local communities in the deve-
lopment of their own rules (bottom up), ‘stereotyped rules’ are in-
troduced in artificially created entities that represent only one part 
of the whole user community (top down) (Blanc-Pamard and Fau-
roux 2004, Bérard 2011, Pollini 2011). For local populations, access 
to natural resources is determined by historically grown relation-
ships; the dynamic social rules and norms structure the communi-
cation and interaction between individuals and groups (Fritz-Vietta 
et al. 2011). Each ethnic group has to be studied in its own context 
to understand all the dynamics in detail. The present study hence 
focuses on one ethnic group, the Tanalana, exploring their rules 
and procedures in decision making to discuss their applicability in 
the CBM context.
Many authors have investigated local rules in the context of 
natural resource management at different places in Madagascar 
(Horning 2000, Kull 2002, Horning 2003a, b, 2004, Muttenzer 2006, 
2010, Bérard 2011 but this paper is the first to focus on the ethnic 
group Tanalana living in southwest Madagascar. Horning (2003a, b) 
and Muttenzer (2006, 2010) point out that it is important to consi-
der customary rules as syncretic constructs of different historical 
moments, not as timeless and fixed entities. Bérard (2009 and 
2011) confirms this statement by demonstrating that customary 
rules are adaptable to the situation and are in a constant state of 
change. In a context of legal pluralism, researchers regularly won-
der about the (in)stability of local and formal rules and try to iden-
tify the factors of (non-)compliance (Horning 2000, 2003a, b). 
Horning (2000), Kull (2002) and Gardner et al. (2008) conclude that 
local rules under certain circumstances can be more effective and 
sustainable for natural resource management than formal rules 
introduced by the state or those supported by conservation agen-
cies. This study contributes to this discussion by demonstrating 
the procedures of establishing and handling rules and pacts 
among the Tanalana in southwestern Madagascar and testing 
their applicability as a basis for the CBM approach.
After presenting the study area and the methodology, this 
paper describes Tanalana society. Key actors and procedures for 
decision making are outlined in order to understand the negotia-
tion of rules for resource management, especially for a fodder 
plant. Finally, the importance of these findings is discussed in the 
context of the CBM approach.
STUDY AREA
Tsimanampesotse National Park (literally “sea/lake without 
dolphins”) was originally founded as the Réserve Naturelle Inté-
grale in 1927 with 17,520 ha in southwestern Madagascar. This 
area was expanded to 43,200 ha by 1966 and became a National 
Park in 2002. The third phase of the NEAP, started in 2003, was 
inspired by the ‘Durban Vision’ of president Ravalomanana, who 
decided in the course of the Fifth World Parks Congress in South 
Africa in to expand Madagascar’s protected area (marine and ter-
restrial) from 1.7 (3%) to 6 million ha (10% of the total surface) by 
2012 (Freudenberger 2010). In this context, Tsimanampesotse Na-
tional Park's area was quintupled between 2005 and 2007 from 
43,200 to 203,744 ha. The whole area of the park currently ex-
tends from the Onilahy River in the north to the Menarandra River 
in the south and affects six rural communes (Beheloke, Itampolo, 
Androka, Ampanihy, Ejeda and Beahitse) in two districts (Tuléar II 
and Ampanihy West) in the region Atsimo Andrefana. The Park is 
part of the geographic region the Mahafaly Plateau, which is com-
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posed of a coastal zone along the Mozambique Channel in the 
west and a limestone plateau in the east. The study area encloses 
six fokontany (smallest deconcentrated administrative unit, com-
posed of one or more villages and their related hamlets) in the ru-
ral commune Beheloke (District Tuléar II) in the north of 
Tsimanampesotse National Park (Figure 1).
The buffer zone of the whole park consists of 31 community-
based management areas, each managed by a COBA (Commu-
nautés de Bases) (cf. Waeber et al. 2015) (Figure 1). Four organisa-
tions support the establishment of COBA contracts, which are 
mainly based on GCF law, and accompany the resource manage-
ment activities in the transferred areas: the NGOs Tany Meva 
Foundation and World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), the German 
federal agency GIZ, and the (semi) state agency Madagascar Na-
tional Parks (MNP), which is also responsible for the management 
of the National Park.
While the associations of the buffer zone establish their own 
rules (dina GELOSE or dina COBA), the management of the Natio-
nal Park is based on the national legislation COAP (Code des Aires 
protégés) and a supplementary park-specific rule system control-
led by MNP. The forest area outside the protected areas is also un-
der the jurisdiction of the State (Supplementary Material). 
Countrywide, MNP rangers and forest state agents (chef de can-
tonnement forestier) govern extensive areas, receive low salary 
and do not have enough equipment to fulfil their tasks in an effec-
tive manner (Bertrand et al. 2014, Cullmann 2015). Consequently, 
access to forest products is ‘quasi free’ for the local population; 
yet this is far from a ‘free rider’ concept as access to land and na-
tural resources is organised by customary rules (Goedefroit 2006).
The ethnic group Tanalana are the main inhabitants of the 
northern periphery of the National Park. The Tanalana are catego-
rized in the official administrative terminology as ‘Mahafaly,’ one 
of eighteen ethnic group identities introduced by the French colo-
nial rulers and adopted thereafter by the Malagasy government, 
researchers and NGOs (Larson 1996). This designation encom-
passes all ethnic groups living to the south of the Onilahy River on 
the Mahafaly Plateau and does not take account of the ethnic he-
terogeneity in this area (Eggert 1981). Interviewees perceive them-
selves as Tanalana (“inhabitants of the coastal plain”), historically 
originating from the Androy and Anosy region in southern Mada-
gascar. They distinguish themselves from other Mahafaly groups. 
At the end of the 15th century, the Tanalana first settled in the lit-
toral of the Mozambique Channel before they went on to populate 
the limestone plateau in the east, where they found better condi-
tions for agriculture and raising livestock during the dry season 
(Esoavelomandroso 1989). Currently living on both sides of Tsima-
nampesotse National Park (Figure 1), members of this agro-pasto-
ral society are closely connected by a common origin (lineage and 
clan affiliation) and through social interactions such as rituals, 
transhumance movement in both directions, and commerce. The 
Tanalana live in a semi-arid area where they mainly practice sub-
sistence agriculture and animal husbandry and are highly de-
pendent on the exploitation of natural resources (e.g., fuel wood, 
construction material, fodder plants for livestock, medicinal 
plants).
While the Tanalana are the main users of natural resources in 
the study area, there are two other user groups living in the vicini-
ty of Tsimanampesotse National Park. The Vezo Sara comprises 
various groups from the north settled along the shoreline, who 
mainly practice fishing (for a discussion of Vezo identity see Astuti 
1995); the Mahafaly are composed of different groups in the east 
of the limestone plateau, who like the Tanalana, mainly practice 
agriculture and animal husbandry. Inter-ethnic marriage and 
flexible adoption of activities, originally linked to the other ethnic 
group, connect these groups. For example, two decades ago many 
of the Tanalana, especially those who are not in contact with live-
stock, started to also practice fishing (mainly without a pirogue), 
while Vezo also work the land and accumulate small ruminants. 
Nevertheless, social rules differ amongst the three groups (ta-
boos, performance and manner of rituals). The sense of belonging 
for the Tanalana is shaped by the agro-pastoralism lifestyle (e.g., 
Poyer and Kelly 2000), their social rules and the self-allocation to a 
clan chieftaincy, whose foundation can ideologically be traced to 
the founding fathers of the Tanalana.
METHODOLOGY
The data was collected in two phases through diverse qualitative 
research techniques. First, the SuLaMa (Sustainable Landmanage-
ment in southwestern Madagascar) project team of Malagasy and 
German researchers conducted an interdisciplinary (agronomy, 
biology, forestry, ecology, anthropology) exploratory case study. By 
applying semi-structured interviews and group discussions, the 
aim was to identify different collective and individual actors on the 
local and regional levels and to gain insight on social structures 
and local perspectives of resource use. I use the term ‘local’ to 
describe the family, lineage, clan, fokontany and commune level, 
the last being in a maximum distance of eight hours by feet for all 
the inhabitants of the commune Beheloke. This first study was 
conducted in four fokontany east and west of the National Park, in 
Efoetse (E 043° 41’ 54.8”, S 24° 04’ 42.4”), Marofijery (E 043° 42’0”, 
S 24° 02’ 0”), Itomboina (E 044° 05’ 10.9”, S 23° 51’ 59.2”) and Mia-
rintsoa (E 044° 06’ 17.7”, S 23° 50’ 14.2”), each for the duration of 
one week in 2011 (SuLaMa 2011). The fokontany were selected 
applying the following criteria: (i) membership in the rural com-
mune Beheloke (2004: 13,117 inhabitants) (Commune de Beheloke 
2005) and (ii) participation in one of the management systems of 
the National Park (co-management of the Park and/or CBM of the 
buffer zone).Figure 1. Tsimanampesotse National Park, community-based management areas and study sites fokontany. (Source SuLaMa, LandSat 2006)
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For the second phase, an extended case study approach was 
chosen (sensu Yin 2003) to assess the perspectives of the local 
individuals and collective actors and to understand their social 
interactions in the process of interest negotiations concerning na-
tural resource use. In collaboration with two research assistants, 
in-depth data collection was carried out for six non-consecutive 
months from 2011–2014 in three fokontany in the littoral, Behe-
loke Haut (E 043° 40’ 16.5”, S 23° 54’ 33.5”), Marofijery and 
Efoetse, and three fokontany on the plateau, Ampotake (E 043° 58’ 
36.6”, S 23° 52’ 27.8”), Itomboina and Miarintsoa. The four fokon-
tany from the first study were chosen and two more were added 
that were identified as important during the first research phase: 
Beheloke Haut is the administrative centre of the rural commune 
and the seat of a clan chief, and Ampotake has the COBA associa-
tion governing the largest forest area located in the north outside 
the National Park (Figure 1).
The main research method for gathering information for this 
study was the semi-structured interview. With the help of Malaga-
sy-French speaking assistants, interviews were conducted with 
125 local people, 94 men and 31 women aged 15 to 80 years from 
different clans and lineages of the Tanalana, who are the main 
users of natural resources in the study area. These included per-
sons with traditional (lineages elders including chiefs) or admi-
nistrative (chef de fokontany, mayor and the corresponding 
deputies and assistants) power, who are relevant for decision ma-
king over natural resource use and other members of the society, 
who practice different natural resource-dependent activities such 
as agriculture, pastoralism, household, carpentry. Additionally, we 
interviewed eleven conservation practitioners from NGOs and 
(inter-)national agencies (Tany Mena, WWF, MNP, GIZ). Relevant ac-
tors for interviews were identified through information from other 
actors by performing a bottom-up driven snowball approach (At-
kinson and Flint 2004).
During the interviews, questions focused first on the social 
context (e.g., lineage/clan affiliation, legitimation) and daily liveli-
hood activities of the interviewees, then on their implication in de-
cision making for natural resource management, their perception 
of (in)formal rules and their interaction with external actors. Sup-
plementary group discussions facilitated observations of negotia-
tion processes amongst actors. This method was combined with 
participatory mapping with individuals and groups, for example 
social and resource maps (Narayanasamy 2009). These tools help 
to understand the distribution of ethnic groups, clans and lineages 
in populated areas and to gain an insight into their perception of 
property of land and natural resources (private and common). 
Through participatory and systematic observation (e.g., (ir)regular 
meetings, daily activities, rituals) it was possible to identify new 
actors relevant for the research and to understand their relation-
ship.
To validate the collected information, the same questions 
were repeated with different persons in different places and time 
(data triangulation); close cooperation was carried out with Mala-
gasy colleagues doing research in related domains in the same 
area (investigator triangulation), and different methods were ap-
plied for data collection such as interviews, observation, participa-
tory techniques (methodological triangulation) (Denzin 1970). Data 
analysis was realised with the computer-supported program At-
las.ti, which facilitated the treatment of the transcribed audio files 
and the code-based elaboration of theory (Smit 2002).
RESULTS
TANALANA ACTORS AND DECISION MAKING. Tanalana society
consists of three clans (raza)––Tevondrone, Temitongoa/Tet-
sivalea and Temilahehe––subdivided into several lineages (famo-
sora), each headed by a traditional chief. While clan members 
refer to a supposedly historical founding ancestor to whom they 
do not necessarily trace genealogical links, the people of a lineage 
refer to a common real nameable consanguineous ancestor. The 
clan and lineage chiefs (mpitan-kazomanga lava and mpitan-kazo-
manga fohe, respectively) are chosen by criteria of genealogy and 
age; they are responsible for performing rituals to maintain the 
balance of the human and the supernatural world. They are a mo-
ral, symbolic, honorific or divine authority enforced through their 
direct relationship to the traditional creator (Zanahary) and the an-
cestors (raza). The traditional chiefs are advised by other elders 
(olobe/roandria) who are the main actors responsible for decision 
making and conflict resolution in Tanalana society. These elders, 
consisting of several persons of the main lineages, have signifi-
cant influence on the placement of persons in administrative (chef 
de fokontany, mayor) and traditional (clan and lineage chiefs) posi-
tions (Figure 2). Although gerontocracy and genealogy prede-
termine the succession of the chief positions, the elders can 
exclude the suggested candidate if he is assessed as unworthy 
because of unsocial behaviour or a lack of social recognition. The 
foundation of a clan or lineage is linked to the establishment of a 
holy pale (a wooden construct of different pieces, called a hazo-
manga), the forging of a holy knife (vy lava) and the enthronization 
of a traditional chief. It is possible for the post of traditional chief 
to be vacant for years or decades, the elders managing the li-
neage or clan without a spiritual head. The traditional chiefs are 
assumed to possess historical knowledge about rules and 
structures in society because of their age and position, whereas 
their capacities and abilities are often limited by their age and 
physical condition. There are exceptional cases of charismatic 
chief personalities who have the authority to convene meetings 
and who are consulted in conflict cases but they are always sur-
rounded by other influential elders.
TANALANA RULES AND PACTS. The social cohabitation of the
Tanalana is structured by the lilin-draza (rules of the an-
cestors), which describe the totality of all rules and codes of 
conduct in Tanalana society. The lilin-draza were established by 
the ancestors at an unknown point in time and are transmitted 
from generation to generation. These rules are in the ‘collective 
knowledge’ (Halbwachs 1967) and often cannot be linked to a 
concrete date or person.
Figure 2. Overlapping levels: (i) administrative levels: fokontany, commune and (ii) 
social levels: lineage, clan, ethnic group.
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The lilin-draza are oral guidelines for the social interaction of 
the lineages, clans or the entire ethnic group. They describe duties 
to be accomplished vis-à-vis the supernatural beings (spirits of 
ancestors, spirits of nature, traditional creator) and other mem-
bers in society. The Tanalana believe that the land, animals and 
natural resources are owned by these supernatural beings and 
only provided to humans for using. This is why the Tanalana per-
form rituals of demand and gratitude in different contexts of natu-
ral resource use, for example when they work the earth or 
practice hatsake (slash and burn cultivation). The lilin-draza indi-
cate how and when to practice rituals to honour elders and 
supernatural beings. “Before you clear the forest, you take a black 
chicken or a sheep to apologize to the supernatural beings, who 
are the owners of the forest, so that nothing will happen during 
the clearing process and we are not blessed by the machete (…).” 
(local resident, Ampotake 2013, quote 40:45).
The lilin-draza also designate what is private property, e.g., 
fenced fields, livestock pens and houses. The land is property of 
the respective clan or lineage. This lineage land is provided to fa-
milies or individuals. The forest area and the pasture area outside 
the agricultural fields is common property, of the trans-fokontany 
boundary fokonolo, and also accessible for other users with or wi-
thout kinship or direct social relations. These areas are used as 
pasture, as well as providing a source for the collection of alimen-
tary and medicinal plants, firewood and construction materials; 
they are also used for hunting and ritual practice.
Taboos (fady called faly in Tanalana dialect), which are a part 
of the rules of ancestors (lilin-draza), prohibit using certain species 
of plants and animals or entering or polluting sacred land (tane fa-
ly) or sacred forest (ala faly). Places are faly when spirits of nature 
or ancestors reside there, or if the holy pale (hazomanga) of the 
traditional chief is planted. These interdictions of conduct have 
different origins (ancestors, spirits of nature, diviner-healer) and 
can concern individuals, families, lineages, clans or the entire eth-
nic group. The place taboos are also binding for outsiders who are 
not members of the belief system.
The elders and supernatural beings ensure compliance of the 
lilin-draza (including faly). If a lilin-draza is transgressed, the elders 
or the supernatural beings can demand that the person concer-
ned perform a purification ritual (hifikifike) with a sacrificial ani-
mal—a chicken, goat or in serious cases, zebu cattle. Many 
interviewees reported that supernatural beings express their 
discomfort with the manner of using natural resources through 
dreams and by forcing people to apologize through compensation 
rituals (for other examples in Madagascar, cf. Bidaud Rakotoarivo-
ny and Ratrimoarivony 2006). The Tanalana believe that if the 
transgressor does not follow the advice of the elders and/ or the 
supernatural beings, he/ she can be condemned to divine sanc-
tion (hakeo), which results in negative consequences like illness, 
diminution of goods or a general imbalance between humans and 
the supernatural world. In cases of rule transgression that 
concern the well-being of the whole group (e.g., pollution of a 
spiritual place), the social pressure to perform a ritual is higher 
than in cases of individual taboo transgression (e.g., ignorance of 
an alimentary taboo); it can even result in social exclusion by the 
traditional chief.
When defiance of a lilin-draza directly harms another person, 
family, lineage, clan or the entire ethnic group, the elders discuss 
the fee that the culprit has to pay in the form of livestock as in-
demnification. The form and amount of punishment is not fixed 
but negotiated case by case; sanctions depend on (a) the frequen-
cy of transgression, (b) the place of transgression, (c) the amount 
of affected persons, (d) the social relationship of the transgressor/ 
culprit and the damaged party, (e) the social status of the trans-
gressor, and (f) his/ her behaviour during the meeting in the past 
and present. The elders are responsible for weighing the different 
factors and their effect on the formulation of social and/ or finan-
cial sanctions. In our study, we observed that lilin-draza serve as a 
basis for discussion, yet are interpreted differently depending on 
the context. “(…) [T]here are people in our village who have trans-
gressed taboos: they made their field near the tombs of an-
cestors, cut ancestral trees that are places for sacrifices and 
deforested the area around the funeral sites. So we were forced 
to make a first meeting with the traditional chief (mpitan-kazo-
BOX 1. FOKONOLONA. Contrasting the official administrative 
definition of fokonolona, “all inhabitants of a fokontany” 
(Decreed N. 2004-299, 3.3.2004) and the original meaning, 
“members of one clan/lineage”, (foko = clan/lineage; olo = 
people/human being), it is obvious that this term needs a 
closer inspection (cf. Pollini and Lassoie 2011 for details). 
What the Tanalana mean by fokonolo (local term for fokono-
lona) depends on the context. Both the traditional chief and 
the chef de fokontany can convene fokonolona (‘communi-
ty’) meetings for decision making and conflict resolution. 
When the Tanalana talk about a meeting convened by the 
traditional chief or the elders, fokonolo means representa-
tives of a lineage or clan living in one or more fokontany (in-
ner or trans-fokontany fokonolo). When they refer to a 
fokonolo meeting at the fokontany level which is convened 
by the chef de fokontany, it describes a group of people 
composed of several members of all ethnic groups, clans 
and lineages (but not all inhabitants) who come together to 
discuss a problem concerning the fokontany territory (fo-
kontany-fokonolo). The administrative nomination fokonolo 
includes several fokonolo, which can be across fokontany 
boundaries. It has been observed that both fokonolo mee-
tings vary considerably from one occasion to another in 
composition and number. But Tanalana people often say 
that it was a meeting of the fokonolo to underline that “eve-
rybody” (of the fokontany inhabitants or clan or lineage 
members) has participated, to reinforce the collective spirit 
and the importance of the results. Because the number and 
the persons are not fixed, the most suitable definition for 
fokonolo, given by an elder, is: “all people who meet at this 
moment to take a decision” (local resident, Beheloke I, 
2011, quote 4:3). An important point to stress is that the fo-
konolo meeting is not the arena to make democratic deci-
sions or to openly discuss all the ideas in society. In all 
meetings observed during the field research, the elders 
made the decision before or outside the official fokonolo 
meeting (already shown for other regions in Madagascar by 
Fauroux in 2003, Blanc-Pamard and Fauroux in 2004). (… ) 
“[W]hen we have to make an important decision, (…) only 
the elders meet and after taking the decision, we convene 
the fokonolo. For this [pre]decision the main lineages of the 
village meet.” (local resident, Ampotake 2013, quote 61:7).
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manga) to discuss the situation. So the chief was forced to formu-
late the sanctions of one goat per person who has transgressed 
the lilin-draza.” (local resident, Marofijery 2013, quote 1:1).
Lilin-draza are frequently transgressed. Interviewees offer a 
diversity of reasons for these transgressions: (a) a lack of kinship 
leading to feeling unconcerned, (b) poverty and the lack of alter-
native income possibilities for natural resource use, (c) a change 
of beliefs from obeying the hazomanga (holy pale) and spirits of 
nature to following Christianity. It is also possible that sacred 
places lose their faly status because the spirit has left the place 
and the people have stopped practicing rituals. Taboos are only 
stable when people value the objects and places regularly 
through sacrifices and prayer. People might not feel concerned by 
lilin-draza if they do not fear the individual moral or material 
consequences; the majority nevertheless use these rules as refe-
rence for conflict-management processes when interacting with 
other members of Tanalana society. Except for place taboos, the 
prohibitions are not valid for outsiders of Tanalana society; for 
example, while the Tanalana stick to the taboo not to hunt and eat 
the radiated tortoise (Astrochelys radiata), they indicate the abode 
of the animal to other consumers and hunters. The handling of 
this taboo shows the group specificity and permeability of taboos; 
it also illustrates that taboos in Madagascar do not automatically 
serve conservation aims (for a discussion of taboos in the context 
of conservation in Madagascar, see Walsh 2002, Horning 2003a, 
2003b, Tengö et al. 2007, Jones et al. 2008, Keller 2009).
Another form of agreement among the Tanalana is the titike 
(vow or curse). This can be a form of social pact or a sincerity 
oath, the former action is used as a conflict prevention tool 
amongst individuals and/ or groups, the latter for identifying 
culprits. The oath contains maledictions and aims to influence the 
conscience of the person who has already done and may still do a 
crime. The Tanalana believe that supernatural beings take respon-
sibility to identify and punish the (potential) culprit. People are 
connected by a symbolic tie and enter in a common agreement of 
mutual trust by reducing mistrust. This ritual is performed espe-
cially in the context of transhumance as an inner and intra-ethnic 
moral connection of herders and host communities (littoral and 
plateau). These pacts are performed by a lineage elder or lineage 
chief according to demand on the fokontany level; they connect 
the transhumance guests (Tanalana and Mahafaly groups) with 
the resident Tanalana population. In 2013 it was additionally per-
formed by the clan chiefs concerning the whole ethnic group Ta-
nalana and their related groups.
A third form of rules are dina (rules/pacts/social convention), 
which are established on the fokontany or commune level, or in 
the context of CBM (Supplementary Material). They are formalised 
in written documentation and legalised on the court level. Bérard 
(2009) distinguishes ‘indigenous dina’ (traditional oral rules 
equivalent to the Tanalanas’ lilin-draza), ‘customary dina’ (formali-
sed rules established during the (post)colonial period) and ‘dina 
GELOSE’ (formalised rules established in the context of CBM). It is 
not possible to determine the exact moment of origin of an 
‘indigenous dina’ in a local society, but researchers agree that the 
term dina was first used in a wider political context during the re-
gime of King Andrianampoinimerina (Condominas 1961, Bérard 
2009). The meaning of the term dina underwent several changes 
within Madagascar’s history, guided by different aims of control or 
decentralisation of power (Bérard 2009, Andriamalala and Gardner 
2010), and hence the term does not mean the same for the per-
sons living in the Malagasy highlands as it does for the coastal in-
habitants. The Tanalana define dina as the formalised rules 
(fokontany, commune, CBM) and use the term lilin-draza to des-
cribe the orally transmitted rules that are blessed by the an-
cestors. “For the vazaha [the state, foreigners or development 
agencies], they have their lilin-draza, which are the dina; in turn 
the traditional society, like ours, we have our dina, which are the 
lilin-draza; and every party tries to see which are the most adap-
table to their milieu.” (local resident, Ampotake 2013, quote 95:3).
COMMUNITY-BASED RESOURCE MANAGEMENT NEAR
TSIMANAMPESOTSE NATIONAL PARK. The initial idea of the
conservation agencies for the implementation of the CBM 
was the elaboration of a set of rules (dina GELOSE/ GCF or dina 
COBA) based on the already existing local rules (lilin-draza/faly) so 
as to assure that members of the COBA associations identify with 
the protection of their own natural resources (GELOSE law 96-025, 
Article 49). However our finding show that the Tanalana have no li-
lin-draza, faly or titike that clearly determines an amount for natu-
ral resource use. There are some taboos prohibiting the use of 
certain natural resources and certain resources that are conside-
red private property, but they do not focus on sustainable use or 
equitable distribution. Furthermore lilin-draza are sometimes li-
neage or clan specific: for example, the taboo to hunt the bird Tur-
nix nigricollis is not binding for all clans and hence cannot serve 
as a common basis for CBM.
The operating conservation agencies (WWF, MNP, GIZ and Ta-
ny Meva) hence prefer to establish new rules for the CBM but 
push this procedure through pre-formulated rules and prede-
termined time schedules. In contrast to the local rhythm and time-
line for rule negotiation the new rules are fixed only in about two 
meetings. Furthermore, promoters of CBM (especially WWF and 
GIZ) appropriated the concept of taboo concerning the whole eth-
nic group by naming one of the zones in the transferred area ala 
faly (sacred forest) (cf. Keller 2009). This zone is equivalent to a 
core zone in the National Park where natural resource use is 
strictly forbidden by the national law, but it has no reference to lo-
cal beliefs: “the sacred forest [in the CBM area] is not taboo in the 
traditional perception (…) it was an order of the WWF” (local re-
sident, Beheloke haut 2012, quote 35:3). In the absence of regular 
ritual practice, the local population does not perceive a place as 
taboo and continue using natural resources.
The new COBA rules, like the locally established rules, are 
not perceived as fixed entities and are variously interpreted by the 
local population (see also Andriamalala and Gardner 2010, Rives 
et al. 2013). There is even a rule violation that is unofficially institu-
tionalized. Two COBAs on the plateau allow their members to 
practice slash and burn (hatsake) for a small amount of money 
distributed to the association. Slash and burn is used by the Ta-
nalana for gaining new agricultural fields and bushfires for stimu-
lating fodder plant growth for raising livestock. In the COBA 
contract, its prohibition follows the (inter-)national conservation 
paradigm (cf. Scales 2011, 2014, Keller 2008). This contrasts the lo-
cal perception that land is the guarantor for life and the continuity 
of mankind (Keller 2008). Disposing enough land for future genera-
tions and the multiplication of cattle, who are the highest cultural 
and economic good, is in the main interest of Tanalana people. 
Access to ancestral land (tanin-draza) through deforestation is ve-
ry often not refused by the executive board of the COBA if the 
person has enough manpower to cultivate the land. Furthermore, 
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social cohesion (fihavanana, filongoa in local accent) and kinship 
relations hinder the application of sanctions (for other examples in 
Madagascar see Andriamalala and Gardner 2010, Fritz-Vietta et al. 
2011).
NEGOTIATION OF RULES FOR THE FODDER PLANT SAMATA. In
contrast to the externally promoted forms of natural resource 
management previously presented, this section explores an 
example of local rule negotiation processes. For about three de-
cades now there has been ongoing negotiation processes in 
some fokontany over the use of the fodder plant samata (Euphor-
bia stenoclada) (Figure 3). Because this natural resource exists 
mainly outside the buffer zone, it has not yet been a focus for 
conservation agencies. Nonetheless, this paper argues that explo-
ring the processes of negotiation surrounding this example can 
help point the way for the future design of CBM.
This key resource serves to feed livestock (goats, sheep and 
mainly cattle), which is the economic and cultural basis of Tanala-
na society (Fauroux 1997). This plant is used in the littoral, espe-
cially in the dry season, by livestock herders (Tanalana and 
Mahafaly) living on the coast and those coming from the plateau 
for transhumance. Unsustainable cutting practices, declining pre-
cipitation, the expansion of agricultural fields, and longer grazing 
periods of cattle herds from the plateau because of the threat of 
cattle raiders has reduced the total number of samata trees in the 
littoral (cf. Goetter 2016).
In Tanalana society there are three different given statuses 
for the property of samata trees: (i) samata trees in the pastoral 
land (monto) are a common pool resource, which means it is: (a) 
accessible to anybody who is an owner or herder of livestock, wi-
thout account of his/ her origin; (b) difficult to exclude somebody 
from; and (c) not available for other users after the subtraction by 
somebody (Ostrom 1990). (ii) Samata trees in livestock pens, in 
private agricultural fields and near houses are accepted and res-
pected as a form of private property (individual, family) according 
to the lilin-draza. (iii) There is collective property that is excluded 
from any form of use, like ritual trees and sources of shade in 
community places like the market. Over the past three decades 
people have expanded their private property claims on additional 
samata. The acceptable distance of private use around the live-
stock pen and the size of enclosures in the pastoral area have 
been discussed on different levels (fokontany, commune, clan), 
but no overlapping fokontany solutions have been attained yet. 
Triggered by increasing conflicts over this fodder plant in a few fo-
kontany, some chef de fokontany addressed the mayor of the 
commune Beheloke who convened a meeting on the commune 
level in 2010. Although the mayor and the chefs de fokontany pro-
moted an establishment of a rule, they still have not agreed on a 
communal dina. Finally the mayor transferred the responsibility 
back to the chefs de fokontany “because they are closer to the 
people” (mayor, Beheloke haut, 2011, quote 15:2). The following 
examples demonstrate that nearly similar constellation of actors 
can nevertheless cause very different ways of rule negotiations.
In the fokontany Beheloke haut the chef de fokontany 
consulted the clan chief of the Temahaleotse, who was also the li-
neage chief of the Tembalaolake, before the communal meeting 
took place. The clan chief required the liberalisation of samata up 
to 30 private samata trees around a livestock pen. The rest is de-
clared public for all Tanalana people and their guests. “Concerning 
the [samata] appropriation, the elder [clan chief] mentioned the 
ancestors are the owner of the samata plants and the land where 
the samata grows is also the ancestors’ property. Therefore, nobo-
dy has the right to appropriate the samata. The samata has to be 
expropriated.” (Local resident, Beheloke haut 2011, quote 13:5).
But the majority of the elders of the main lineages promote 
the measurement of one hectare of private samata (30 tratra = 
about 50–60 square meters) around the livestock pen. Neverthe-
less, many elders are convinced that an effective regulation needs 
the moral support of the chief, who can reinforce sanctions 
through his direct relationship to the traditional creator (Zana-
hare). That is why they try to convince or instrumentalise the 
traditional chief for their purposes but the clan chief refused to 
change his initial statement. Additionally, intra- and inter-lineage 
differences, caused by different amounts in cattle and hence dif-
ferent needs for samata, hinder common agreement. This situa-
tion supports my statement that most of the traditional chiefs had 
more a function as a consultative and morally supportive organ 
rather than a position as real decision maker.
Another example of rule negotiation took place in the fokon-
tany Marofijery. Some 30 years ago the ex-lineage chief of the 
Tantsihay (clan Tevondrone) and the surrounding elders supported 
a mutual idea and established a rule for some aspects of samata 
use, limiting the private use to one hectare around the livestock 
pen, only one of which is permitted per cattle owner. Although the 
content of this rule is perceived as lilin-draza, the negotiation pro-
cess is remembered and can be described by the majority of the 
cattle herders. The process is also continuously revisited as per-
sons with large livestock herds often transgress this agreement. 
This situation shows that lilin-draza are not timeless and unchan-
geable. Similar to statements from Beheloke haut, the majority of 
interviewees from Marofijery (elders and young men) underline 
the importance of including the traditional chief and the ineffecti-Figure 3. Cattle herder cutting samata tree (Euphorbia stenoclada).
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veness of state institutions. “It is an initiative of the community 
and permitted by the mpitan-kazomanga (lineage chief of the 
Tantsihay, part of the clan Tevondrone), so that means it is a lilin-
draza (rules of the ancestors) (…) [W]hen it is a lilin-draza, it is the 
responsibility of the traditional chief and not of the chef de fokon-
tany (…) If it was a dina, I’m sure that it would fall through. We 
take care of our lilin-draza, so we accept the regulation of the 
private samata because we are determined by the fundamental 
rules, which are the lilin-draza.” (local resident, Marofijery 2013, 
quote 104:1). “It’s right that there are state institutions like the 
mayor and the chef de fokontany but we have always to ask for 
permission of our traditional chief because we people of the litto-
ral respect our lilin-draza. (…). The chef de fokontany also has to 
obey the lilin-draza.” (local resident, Marofijery 2013, quote: 114:1).
Although a greater consensus about the regulation of the 
fodder plant exists in Marofijery than in Beheloke haut, no new 
rule (dina) could be established or no already existent rule (lilin-
draza) could be re-established either. Even if a clear consensus 
concerning the private status of samata (inside livestock pens, 
agricultural fields and near houses) and the non-usable collective 
samata (ritual trees, providers of shade) exist, the sanctions for 
transgressions are contextually negotiated. While in one case the 
culprit had to pay two sheep for logging a tree on the market 
place, another person who cut several trees in another’s agricul-
tural field was not punished at all. The first person had already ta-
ken another tree from this place without permission and the act 
damages the whole community as they lose a source of shade. 
The second person had destroyed more trees but it was on their 
kin’s field. These examples illustrate that even based on the same 
rule, different settings and conditions cause different sanctions.
Both fokontany cases explored above, Beheloke haut and 
Marofijery, show that the establishment of rules is a long-term on-
going process. Rules that are already established have to be rene-
gotiated after a certain time and in cases of transgression, are 
variously interpreted. Moreover, which levels are used for a rule 
negotiation process, and the order of these, is not fixed and de-
pends on the personal skills of certain people. Finally, actors and 
their responsibilities on administrative levels (fokontany and com-
mune) and social levels (clan and lineage) overlap and hinder a 
clear reference framework for the establishment of rules. In the 
following section I will discuss these problems by analysing dif-
ferent forms of local rules and levels in the context of CBM.
DISCUSSION
IMPACT FOR COMMUNITY-BASED MANAGEMENT IN THE
BUFFER ZONE OF TSIMANAMPESOTSE NATIONAL PARK. One
of the main questions in the CBM context is how to anchor 
the COBA associations; there is the choice between a geographic 
level (fokontany) or a social level (clan, lineage), and there is also a 
choice of what form of agreements and rules (dina, lilin-draza) to 
use (Blanc-Pamard and Rakoto Ramiarantsoa 2007, Pollini et al. 
2014). Most of the COBAs in the research area, like most across 
Madagascar, are composed of voluntary members from one or 
more fokontany (see Figure 4, Model I) While the initial idea of the 
GELOSE-law aims for a transfer of management rights to the 
whole fokontany-based community (the administrative sense of 
fokonolo) (see Figure 4, Model II), the passed law text only sup-
ports the foundation of an exclusive unit which does not include 
all resource users (Pollini and Lassoie 2011). Attention is drawn 
here again to the Tanalanas’ perception of fokonolo, which has 
two dimensions: they have a trans-fokontany identity (lineages 
and clans), the territorial reference of which is the ancestral tomb, 
and a fokontany-fokonolo identity, which comprises the inhabi-
tants of a clearly defined administrative territory, the fokontany. 
There are hence three possibilities for composing the member-
ship of a COBA association: (i) voluntary members of one or more 
fokontany (Figure 4, Model I), (ii) all resource users in a fokontany 
concerning the administrative unit (Figure 4, Model II) or (iii) all re-
source users in all fokontany that concern the clan level (Figure 4, 
Model III).
Because of the Tanalana’s trans-fokontany identity, it is diffi-
cult with fokontany-fokonolo decisions to restrict natural resource 
use outside of the private areas (e.g., fields and livestock pens). All 
resources in this area, including samata, are perceived as ‘com-
mon property’ (sensu Ostrom 1990) and are accessible to every-
body. This perception of property suggests that fokontany 
boundaries are of little importance for the management of natural 
resources. Some conservation agencies try to manage the trans-
fokontany border use of natural resources by integrating several 
fokontany in one COBA association, but these are also only com-
posed of voluntary members and exclude other users of natural 
resources (see Figure 4, Model Ib) (see also Andriamalala and 
Gardner 2010).
Despite trans-fokontany identity and resource use, Tanalana 
make agreements and discuss rules with clear fokontany bounda-
ry reference. The small social pact (titike) and the rules for samata 
use were applied and discussed mainly on the fokontany level. 
Solutions were additionally searched on the trans-fokontany 
boundary or clan level, but with less influence on daily behaviour. 
Ostrom (1990) argues that for successful collective action in natu-
ral resource management it is important to define clear bounda-
ries of the people who are using the resources. She specifies this 
aspect in further publications: “membership [to a user group] may 
also be marked by symbolic boundaries and involve (...) rituals 
and beliefs that help solidify individual beliefs about the trustwor-
thiness of others” (Ostrom 2014). In line with this, I argue that it is 
useful to take a look at these locally initiated agreements, analyse 
their level of effectiveness and prove their usability for reorgani-
sing the community-based natural resource management asso-
ciations.
In our study, the negotiations observed on the fokontany le-
vel concerning the use of samata aim only to control the privatiza-
Figure 4. Proposed models for composition of the community-based 
management associations COBAs (communautés de base). (modified from Pollini 
et al. 2014)
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tion process inside a fokontany; there is no restriction on general 
use of common samata by others as this contradicts the trans-fo-
kontany identity (cf. Goetter 2016). Interviewees mentioned that 
the reason for integrating the clan chief in the discussion process 
was not the need to restrict common property access for persons 
not part of the fokontany-fokonolo, but rather to morally support 
the decisions made on the lineage level concerning the respective 
fokontany-fokonolo. Our study supports the conclusion of other 
researchers that the fokontany-fokonolo level, based on the main 
lineages, is the reference framework for decision making (cf. 
Blanc-Pamard and Fauroux 2004, Muttenzer 2010). The same is 
true for the small titike, which is performed with the respective fo-
kontany-fokonolo members and transhumance guests (Goetter 
2016). In spite of the Tanalanas’ trans-fokontany identity and re-
source usage, this study shows that the clan level and its authori-
ties are not as action orientated as the lineage level 
(fokontany-fokonolo). Consequently, the clan level is not the most 
effective form to anchor CBM associations. This does not imply a 
lack of clan identity but only shows the limit of clan authority to 
influence daily behaviour. The following quote underlines this 
finding: “This initiative is born in the community of Marofijery. As 
inhabitants of Marofijery it is our task to find the adequate rules. 
We do not have to wait for the decision of the clan chief because 
the clan chief does not have the right to put pressure on our or-
ganisation. We have to focus on the essential things in our fokon-
tany. It is the task of our lineage chief who tries to find a 
consensus for the well-being of our fokontany and a well-establi-
shed rule.” (local resident, Marofijery 2013, quote: 114:2).
The question then arises, could lilin-draza or titike on a fo-
kontany level be a basis for the CBM association’s rules? Although 
researchers have shown that sometimes existing forms of local 
agreements or institutions can provide more acceptance and res-
pect for CBM structures (Kull 2002, Horning 2003b, Blanc-Pamard 
and Fauroux 2004), others question their use. For instance, Blanc-
Pamard and Fauroux (2004) question the usability of a titike or li-
lin-draza for CBM among another ethnic group in the southwest 
of Madagascar, the Sakalava, because of the conservative nature 
of these rules which reinforce the existing power structures. Addi-
tionally, Kull 2002 and Pollini et al. 2014 warn against ignoring the 
ethnic heterogeneous composition of local societies and hence of 
COBA associations when forming COBA associations. This critique 
is valid if we are proposing already existing structures as possible 
forms for CBM because the fokonolo does not consist of the 
whole lineage/ clan or all the inhabitants of a fokontany; it is a 
constantly changing group of persons dominated by the elders of 
the main Tanalana lineages (for another example in Madagascar, 
see Goedefroit 2006). The ethnic heterogeneity is partially taken 
into account since Tanalana authorities discuss and make the 
pacts and rules, Mahafaly and Vezo groups participate in the ritual 
procedure and/ or in the financing of the sacrificial animal. They 
are morally connected through social and kinship relations with 
the Tanalana, who are then responsible that these related groups 
respect the agreements. For the duration of their stay, seasonal 
Mahafaly migrants are temporary members of the Tanalana socie-
ty and thereby have to follow local rules and pacts. Horning 
argues that “social contracts” or social pacts are only practiced 
when there is a special need for social cohesion on selected is-
sues in ethnic heterogenic societies (Horning 2003b). However, 
this study observes that titike both on the fokontany and clan le-
vels are not only practiced to enforce social cohesion between 
different ethnic groups (Tanalana, Mahafaly and Vezo groups) but 
also within Tanalana society.
Further arguments question the application of a titike in the 
CBM context: cattle and other goods that are integrated in the ti-
tike are by consensus classified as private property and are there-
by not allowed to be used by others, while forest resources are 
common property and can be used by everybody. The social pact 
does not contain concrete formulations of sanctions. If a titike is 
applied for CBM, the content of the given titike needs to be dis-
cussed at the same level of detail as it was for the fodder plant 
rule negotiation process. While the titike is more of a spontaneous 
reaction to a menacing security situation, the CBM needs a long-
term, more or less stable arrangement. A titike thus cannot serve 
as a replacement for a dina but it could work as reinforcement.
Regulations for forest resources managed through CBM 
contracts have mainly failed because of the different economic 
interests and the trans-fokontany ‘use right philosophy’ (sensu 
Esoavelomandroso 1989), as also seen in the case for the fodder 
plant negotiations. The samata case illustrates the time needed 
for negotiation processes over use restriction, as well as specifi-
cally demonstrating that local actors often reject the application of 
trans-fokontany rules for trans-fokontany resources. These 
examples show some of the limits for CBM management arrange-
ments.
CONCLUSION
Although the CBM approach aims for local population participa-
tion, the content, manner and speed for the establishment of 
rules are highly influenced by conservation agencies. Examples 
worldwide have shown that locally evolved rules are more binding 
for local people than externally imposed or initiated arrangements 
(Baland and Platteau 1996, Ostrom 2000, Horning 2004). Neverthe-
less, it is important to state that local rules are neither entirely 
respected, nor are they per se sustainable or effective for biodi-
versity conservation (Walsh 2002, Horning 2003b, 2004).
If conservationists are interested in supporting collective ac-
tion for sustainable resource management on local levels, they 
have to be aware of long periods of rule negotiation (Berkes 2004, 
Goetter and Neudert 2016). Even when the moment of establi-
shing a rule arrives, it is important to remember that existing rules 
are constantly being renegotiated. Furthermore, each existing rule 
is interpreted depending on the context and does not raise the 
claim of general validity and stability. Agreements that are made in 
a specific context (e.g., cattle theft) or for a specific resource (e.g., 
samata) cannot be transferred automatically to other conflicts or 
other natural resources.
Rules that are established in the context of CBM (dina GE-
LOSE) are subject to the same mechanisms as locally initiated 
rules (lilin-draza, titike): transgression and adaption to individual 
needs are an integral part of the system (Rives et al. 2013). It is dif-
ficult to find the right form of agreements for CBM and also to 
identify the right level to anchor the CBM association. Each level is 
problematic in different ways : (i) A COBA association consisting of 
voluntary members of one or more fokontany (Model Ia and b), 
excludes other resource users (Pollini and Lassoie 2011), (ii) a CO-
BA association consisting of all people in a fokontany (fokontany-
fokonolona) (Model II) contradicts the trans-fokontany resource 
use philosophy (Goetter and Neudert 2016), and (iii) a COBA asso-
ciation on the commune or clan level (Modell III) is not action 
orientating for the local people in their daily behaviour (Kull 2002, 
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Blanc-Pamard and Fauroux 2004). The optimal solution would be 
to establish a dina on the commune and fokontany level based on 
a rule of ancestor or taboo that includes at least all Tanalana clans 
and is reinforced annually by a titike that obliges other ethnic 
groups to follow the agreement. However, this is only possible for 
some specific resources and not for the whole set of rules needed 
for CBM.
REFERENCES
Andriamalala, G. & Gardner, C. 2010. L’utilisation du dina comme outil de 
gouvernance des ressources naturelles: leçons tirés de Velondriake, sud-
ouest de Madagascar. Tropical Conservation Science 3 (4): 447–472. 
Available at <goo.gl/yDnpVZ>
Antona, M., Biénabe, E. M., Salles, J.-M., Péchard, G., Aubert, S. and Ratsimbarison, 
R. 2004. Rights transfers in Madagascar biodiversity policies: achievements 
and significance. Environment and Development Economics 9, 6: 825–847. 
(doi:10.1017/S1355770X04001640)
Astuti, R. 1995. ‘The Vezo are not a kind of people’: identity, difference, and 
‘ethnicity’ among a fishing people of western Madagascar. American 
Ethnologist 22, 3: 464–482. (doi:10.1525/ae.1995.22.3.02a00010)
Atkinson, R. and Flint, J. 2004. Snowball sampling. In: Encyclopedia of Social 
Science Research Methods. M. S. Lewis-Beck, A. Bryman, T. F. Liao (eds.), pp 
1423–1432. SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks.
Baland, J.-M. and Platteau, J.-P. 1996. Halting degradation of natural resources: is 
there a role for rural communities? FAO and Oxford University Press.
Bérard, M. H. 2009. Légitimité des Normes Environnementales et Complexité du 
Droit: l’Exemple de l’Utilisation des Dina dans la Gestion Locale de la Forêt à 
Madagascar (1996–2006). Unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, Université de Laval, Québec. 
Available at <www.theses.ulaval.ca/2009/26361/26361_1.pdf>
Bérard, M.-H. 2011. Légitimités et normes environnementales dans la gestion 
locale de la forêt à Madagascar. Canadian Journal of Law & Society 26, 1: 
89–111. (doi:10.3138/cjls.26.1.089)
Berkes, F. 2004. Rethinking community-based conservation. Conservation Biology 
18, 3: 621–630. (doi:10.1111/j.1523-1739.2004.00077.x)
Bertrand, A., Aubert, S., Montagne, P., Lohanivo A. C. & Razafintsalama, M. H. 2014. 
Madagascar, politique forestière: Bilan 1990–2013 et propositions. 
Madagascar Conservation & Development 9, 1: 20–30. 
(doi:10.4314/mcd.v9i1.4)
Bidaud Rakotoarivony, C. and Ratrimoarivony, M. 2006. Terre ancestrale ou parc 
national? Entre la légitimité sociale et légalité à Madagascar. VertigO - La 
Revue Électronique en Sciences de l'Environnement 7, 2: 1–10.
Blanc-Pamard, C. & Fauroux, E. 2004. L’illusion participative. Exemples ouest-
malgaches. Autrepart 31, 3: 3–19. (doi:10.3917/autr.031.0003)
Blanc-Pamard, C. & Rakoto Ramiarantsoa, H. 2007. Normes environnementales, 
transferts de gestion et recompositions territoriales en pays Betsileo 
(Madagascar). Natures Sciences Sociétés 15, 3: 253–268. 
(doi:10.1051/nss:2007055)
Commune Beheloke, WWF, ANGAP & GTZ 2005. Monographie de la commune 
Beheloke. Toliara.
Condominas, G. 1960. Fokon’olona et Collectivitées Rurales en Imerina. Berger-
Levrault, Paris. Available at <http://horizon.documentation.ird.fr/exl-
doc/pleins_textes/divers11-03/22732.pdf>
Cullmann, G. 2015. Community forest management as virtualism in northeastern 
Madagascar. Human Ecology 43, 1: 29–41. (doi:10.1007/s10745-015-9725-5)
Denzin, N. K. (ed.) 1970. Sociological Methods: A Sourcebook. Aldine Atherton, 
Chicago.
Eggert, K. 1981. Who are the Mahafaly? Cultural and social mis-identifications in 
southwestern Madagascar. Omaly Sy Anio (Hier et Aujourd’hui), Revue 
d’Études Historiques Antananarivo 13–14: 149–176.
Esoavelomandroso, M. 1989. Territoires et troupeaux des Temitongoa. In: Histoire 
et Organisation de l’Espace à Madagascar. J. Fremigacci (ed.), pp 47–56. 
Karthala, Paris.
Fauroux, E. 1997. Les Éleveurs de l'Ouest Malgache face aux Difficultés 
Économiques du Dernier Quart du XXe siècle. Paper presented at the 
conference ‘Atelier Ménages et Crises’ Marseille 24–26 March 1997. 
Available at <http://ow.ly/TOiPn>
Fauroux, E. 2003. Structures micro-locales du pouvoir et gouvernance dans les 
villages de l’Ouest malgache. In: La Gouvernance Locale à Madagascar: 
Représentation, Modélisation, Participation. M. Langlois, P. Méral, L. 
Raharinirina Rabaovololona, B. S Ralalaoherivony (eds.), pp 2–18. Cahiers du 
C3EDM.
Freudenberger, K. 2010 Paradise Lost? Lessons from 25 Years of USAID 
Environment Programs in Madagascar. Final Report U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID). International Research Group, 
Washington DC. Available at <https://goo.gl/Z0Zeci>
Fritz-Vietta, N., Röttger, C. and Stoll-Kleemann, S. 2009. Community-based 
management in two biosphere reserves in Madagascar—distinctions and 
similarities: What can be learned from different approaches? Madagascar 
Conservation & Development 4, 2: 86–97. (doi:10.4314/mcd.v4i2.48648)
Fritz-Vietta, N. V. M., Ferguson, H. B., Stoll-Kleemann, S. and Ganzhorn, J. U. 2011. 
Conservation in a biodiversity hotspot: Insights from cultural community 
perspectives in Madagascar. In: Biodiversity Hotspots. F. E. Zachos and J. C. 
Habel (eds.), pp 209–233. Springer-Verlag, Berlin/Heidelberg.
Gardner, C. J., Ferguson, B., Rebara, F. and Ratsifandrihamanana, A. N. 2008. 
Integrating traditional values and management regimes into Madagascar's 
expanded protected area system: the case of Ankodida. In: Protected 
Landscapes and Cultural and Spiritual Values. J.-M. Mallarach (ed.), pp 
92–103. Kasparek Verlag, Heidelberg.
Goedefroit, G. 2006. La restitution du droit à la parole. Études Rurales 178, 2: 
39–64.
Goetter, J. F. 2016. The cattle raiders leave us no choice: New transhumance in the 
Mahafaly Plateau region in Madagascar. Madagascar Conservation & 
Development 11, 1: 12–22. (doi:10.4314/mcd.v11i1.3)
Goetter, J. F. and Neudert, R. 2016. New rules are not rules: Privatization of 
pastoral commons and local attempts at curtailment in southwest 
Madagascar. International Journal of the Commons 10, 2: 617–641. 
(doi:10.18352/ijc.743)
Halbwachs, M. 1967 Das kollektive Gedächtnis. Enke, Stuttgart.
Hanson, P. W. 2012. Towards a more transformative participation in the 
conservation of Madagascar’s natural resources. Geoforum 43, 6: 
1182–1193. (doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2012.03.005)
Horning, N. R. 2000. Conference Paper. Explaining compliance with rules 
governing forest common pool-resource and conservation: dynamics in 
Bara Country. Southwestern Madagascar. Presented at Constituting the 
Commons: Crafting Sustainable Commons in the New Millennium, Eighth 
Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common 
Property, Bloomington, Indiana. 31.5- 4.6.2000. Available at <goo.gl/sSXfd7>
Horning, N. R. 2003a. The cost of ignoring rules: forest conservation and rural 
livelihood outcomes in Madagascar. Forests, Trees and Livelihoods 15, 2: 
149–166. (doi:10.1080/14728028.2005.9752517)
Horning, N. R. 2003b. How rules affect conservation outcomes. In: The Natural 
History of Madagascar. S. M. Goodman and J. P. Benstead (eds.), pp 146–153. 
The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Horning, N. R. 2004. The Limits of Rules: When Rules Promote Forest Conservation 
and When They Do Not – Insights from Bara Country, Madagascar. Unpubl. 
Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University, Cornwell. Available at <goo.gl/AlQbF7>
Jones, J. P. G., Andriamarovololona, M. M. and Hockley, N. 2008. The importance of 
taboos and social norms to conservation in Madagascar. Conservation 
Biology 22, 4: 976–986. (doi:10.1111/j.1523-1739.2008.00970.x)
Keller, E. 2008. The banana plant and the moon: Conservation and the Malagasy 
ethos of life in Masoala, Madagascar. American Ethnologist 35, 4: 650–664. 
(doi:10.1111/j.1548-1425.2008.00103.x)
Keller, E. 2009. The danger of misunderstanding ‘culture’. Madagascar 
Conservation & Development 4, 2: 82–85. (doi:10.4314/mcd.v4i2.48647)
Kull, C. A. 2002. Empowering pyromaniacs in Madagascar: ideology and legitimacy 
in community-based natural resource management. Development and 
Change 33, 1: 57–78. (doi:10.1111/1467-7660.00240)
MADAGASCAR CONSERVATION & DEVELOPMENT VOLUME 11 | ISSUE 2 — DECEMBER 2016 PAGE 76
Larson, P. M. 1996. Desperately seeking ‘the Merina’ (central Madagascar): reading 
ethnonyms and their semantic fields in African identities history. Journal of 
Southern African Studies 22, 4: 541–560. (doi:10.1080/03057079608708511)
Marcus, R. R. and Kull, C. 1999. Setting the stage: the politics of Madagascar's 
Environmental efforts. African Studies Quarterly 3, 2: 1–8.
Mercier, J.-R. 2006. The preparation of the National Environmental Action Plan 
(NEAP): Was it a false start? Madagascar Conservation & Development 1, 1: 
50–54. (doi:10.4314/mcd.v1i1.44122)
Muttenzer, F. 2006. Conference Paper. Coutume Ancestrale et Droit Coutumier: 
Problème de Connaissance et de Reconnaissance des Droits Fonciers. 
Colloque International ‘Les Frontières de la Question Foncière. Montpellier. 
Available at <goo.gl/FQyaSF>
Muttenzer, F. 2010. Déforestation et Droit Coutumier à Madagascar: Les 
Perceptions des Acteurs de la Gestion Communautaire des Forêts. Karthala, 
Paris.
Myers, N., Mittermeier, R. A., Mittermeier, C. G., da Fonseca, G. A. B. and Kent, J. 
2000. Biodiversity hotspots for conservation priorities. Nature 403, 6772: 
853–858. (doi:10.1038/35002501)
Narayanasamy, N. 2009. Participatory Rural Appraisal: Principles, Methods and 
Application. SAGE Publications, New Delhi.
Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for 
Collective Action. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, UK.
Ostrom, E. 2000. Collective action and the evolution of social norms. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 14, 3: 137–158. (doi:10.1257/jep.14.3.137)
Ostrom, E. 2014. Collective action and evolution of social norms. Journal of 
Natural Resources Policy Research 6, 4: 235–252. 
(doi:10.1080/19390459.2014.935173)
Pollini, J. 2011. The difficult reconciliation of conservation and development 
objectives: The case of the Malagasy Environmental Action Plan. Human 
Organization 70, 1: 74–87. (doi:10.17730/humo.70.1.6879m4w585133302)
Pollini, J. and Lassoie, J. P. 2011. Trapping farmer communities within global 
environmental regimes: the case of the GELOSE legislation in Madagascar. 
Society & Natural Resources 24, 8: 814–830. 
(doi:10.1080/08941921003782218)
Pollini, J., Hockley, N., Muttenzer, F. D. and Ramamonjisoa, B. S. 2014. The transfer 
of natural resource management rights to local communities. In: 
Conservation and Environmental Management in Madagascar. I. R. Scales 
(ed.), pp 172–192. Routledge, London and New York.
Poyer, L. and Kelly, R. L. 2000. Mystification of the Mikea: constructions of foraging 
identity in southwest Madagascar. Journal of Anthropological Research 56, 
2: 163–185. (doi:10.1086/jar.56.2.3631361)
Raik, D. 2007. Forest management in Madagascar: An historical overview. 
Madagascar Conservation & Development 2, 1: 5–10. 
(doi:10.4314/mcd.v2i1.44123)
Rives, F., Carrière, S. M., Montagne, P., Aubert, S. and Sibelet, N. 2013. Forest 
Management Devolution: Gap between technicians' design and villagers' 
practices in Madagascar. Environmental Management 52, 4: 877–893. 
(doi:10.1007/s00267-013-0138-1)
Scales, I. R. 2011. Lost in translation: conflicting views of deforestation, land use 
and identity in western Madagascar. The Geographical Journal 178, 1: 67–79. 
(doi:10.1111/j.1475-4959.2011.00432.x)
Scales, I. R. 2014. The future of conservation and development in Madagascar: 
time for a new paradigm? Madagascar Conservation & Development 9, 1: 
5–12. (doi:10.4314/mcd.v9i1.2)
Smit, B. 2002. Atlas.ti for qualitative data analysis. Perspectives in Education 20, 3: 
65–76.
SuLaMa 2011. Recherche Participative pour Appuyer la Gestion Durable des 
Terres du Plateau Mahafaly dans le Sud-ouest de Madagascar: Diagnostic 
Participatif de la Gestion des Ressources Naturelles sur le Plateau Mahafaly 
Commune Rurale Beheloke. Rapport final SuLaMa (ed.). SuLaMa, Tuléar. 
Available at <http://www.sulama.de/files/rapport_marp_2011_mid.pdf>
Tengö, M., Johansson, K., Rakotondrasoa, F., Lundberg, J., Andriamaherilala, J.-A., 
Rakotoarisoa, J.-A. and Elmqvist T. 2007. Taboos and forest governance: 
Informal protection of hot spot dry forest in southern Madagascar. AMBIO 
36, 8: 683–691. (doi:10.1579/0044-7447(2007)36[683:TAFGIP]2.0.CO;2)
Waeber, P. O., Wilmé, L., Ramamonjisoa, B., Garcia, C., Rakotomalala, D., et al. 2015. 
Dry forests in Madagascar: neglected and under pressure. International 
Forestry Review 17, S2: 127–148. (doi:10.1505/146554815815834822)
Waeber, P. O., Wilmé, L., Mercier, J. R., Camara, C. and Lowry II, P. P. 2016. How 
effective have thirty years of internationally driven conservation and 
development efforts been in Madagascar? PLoS ONE 11, 8: e0161115. 
(doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0161115)
Walsh, A. 2002. Responsibility, taboos and ‘The freedom to do otherwise’ in 
Ankarana, northern Madagascar. Journal of the Royal Anthropological 
Institute 8, 3: 451–468. (doi:10.1111/1467-9655.00117)
Yin, R. K. 2003. Case Study Research, Design and Methods. SAGE Publications Inc., 
Thousand Oaks.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL.
Available online only.
Table S1. Different types of rules in the context of natural resource 
management.
Thielsen, K. 2016. Which form of agreement works for community-based management? Case study 
from southwestern Madagascar. Madagascar Conservation & Development 11, 2: 66–76. 
http://dx.doi.org.104314/mcd.v11i1.5 Supplementary Material 
 
 
Table S1. Different types of rules in the context of natural resource management. 
Rule Area concerned  Persons/institutions 
responsible for 
establishment 
Persons 
concerned 
Persons/ beings 
responsible for 
sanctions  
Importance for 
the use of 
resources 
Customary rules and pacts (oral / non formalised) 
Lilin-draza (Rules 
of ancestors) 
Everywhere (inside 
and outside the 
protected areas) 
Ancestors, Diviner-
healer, Supernatural 
beings 
Clan, Lineage, 
Ethnic group  
Elders of the main 
lineages 
Supernatural 
beings 
Determines form 
of property social 
and spiritual 
interaction  
Faly (Taboo which 
are part of the lilin-
draza) 
Certain places and 
certain resources  
Ancestors, Diviner-
healer, Supernatural 
beings  
Individual, Clan, 
Lineage, Ethnic 
group or 
everybody 
(Malagasy and 
foreigner) 
Elders of the main 
lineages, 
Supernatural 
beings 
Prohibits the use 
of certain species 
(animals and 
plants), on certain 
days and in 
certain places  
Titike (Social pact 
or sincerity oath) 
a) fokontany  a) lineage elder or 
chief  
a) inhabitants of a 
fokontany and 
guests  
Elders of the main 
lineages, 
Supernatural 
beings 
Concerns 
removable objects 
and difficult to 
apply in the CBM 
context  
b) regional  b) clan elder or chief  b) all Tanalana 
and related ethnic 
groups  
Dina = rule / convention (written / formalised) 
Dina fokontany 
(fokontany rule) 
Area of the 
fokontany (villages 
and related 
hamlets) 
Administrative 
fokonolo 
(representatives of 
the inhabitants of the 
fokontany)  
All the inhabitants 
of the fokontany 
Chef de fokontany 
and Administrative 
fokonolo 
Does not exist in 
study region 
Dina GELOSE for 
the community- 
based 
management 
Transferred area in 
the buffer zone of 
the 
Tsimanampesotse 
National Park  
Members of the 
COBA  
Members of the 
COBA.  
Executive bureau 
of the COBA 
association 
Determines the 
period and amount 
of logging, hunting 
and collecting 
natural resources 
and the 
reforestation 
duties  
State law (formalised) 
Forest Law no. 
97-017, 8.8.1997 
Outside the 
protected areas  
Ministry of 
Environment, 
Ecology, the Sea and 
Forest 
Everybody 
(Malagasy and 
foreigner) 
Forest agent, 
Forest &Water 
Directorate, 
Regional  
Determines the 
period and amount 
of logging in the 
state forest 
Code for the 
management of 
protected areas 
(COAP law no. 
2001-005, 
11.2.2003) 
All protected areas 
in Madagascar 
including 
Tsimanampesotse 
National Park  
Ministry of 
Environment, 
Ecology, Sea and 
Forest 
Everybody 
(Malagasy and 
foreigner) 
Madagascar 
National Parks 
(MNP), Forest 
agent, Forest & 
Water Directorate, 
Regional  
Determines the 
period and amount 
of logging, hunting 
and collecting of 
some natural 
resources 
 
